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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-HOT PURSUIT

Following armed robbery of Diamond Cab Company police
were notified that two employees had followed suspect Hayden
to a certain house. Within minutes, officers converged on the
house and undertook without a warrant an extensive search of
the entire premises. When Hayden was located in an upstairs
bedroom, an officer in the basement had already seized clothing found in a washing machine.' The clothing was admitted
into evidence as matching the description of that worn by the
robber. The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial
of habeas corpus relief, ruling that the clothing seized during
the course of the lawful search was mere evidence and inadmissible.2 The United States Supreme Court held, the fourth
amendment 3 does not prohibit the seizure of mere evidence. The
instant search was lawful, although without a warrant, because
it was made in "hot pursuit" of an armed felon. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
While the opinion in the instant case deals largely with
abolishing the mere evidence rule,4 this Note shall concentrate
on the "hot pursuit" ruling which raises new and interesting
aspects of warrantless search.
Although there is no general rule as to when search without warrant is proper, the Supreme Court has allowed it in certain situations.,5 For example, the search of a moving vehicle is
1. The indication is, although it is unclear from the opinion, that this
seizure took place before the arrest. The Court referred to an officer's testimony that he had seized the clothing by the time he knew a man was in
the house, and it refused to apply Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947),

because the suspect there was in custody before the search began. The Court
noted that the instant seizures were "prior to or immediately contemporaneous with" the arrest. 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967). It can be inferred that the

clothing was not seized after the arrest.
2. Hayden v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir.
1966).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
4. In abrogating the mere evidence rule established in Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), the Court made it clear that the "principal object"
of the fourth amendment is to protect privacy, not property, and that a
seizure of evidentiary material, if otherwise reasonable, is no more disruptive of privacy than a search for fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband.

387 U.S. 204, 301-02 (1967). For a comprehensive treatment of the mere evidence rule from its common law beginning, see Comment, 27 LA. L. REV. 53
(1966).
5. See generally, J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 87 (1966).
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permissible when there is probable cause to believe it is carrying
contraband, as is the search of a person and the premises under
Under
his immediate control when incidental to lawful arrest
certain circumstances, a warrant is not necessary if the delay
required to obtain one threatens destruction of the evidence. 8
But Hayden fits into none of the precedents. Since the officers
were searching the premises before arrest, the cases on search
incidental to arrest were inapplicable.
While reversing on the mere evidence rule, the court of
appeals sustained the legality of the search of Hayden's home
by relying on Harris v. United States." In Harris, an intensive
five-hour apartment search resulting in the seizure of evidence
totally unrelated to the offense for which the suspect was
arrested was upheld as incidental to lawful arrest. On appeal,
petitioner argued that the search itself was illegal because it
exceeded the limitations of Harris, and urged re-examination of
that case. The Supreme Court upheld the search and seizure,
but did not rely on Harris because the suspect there was in custody prior to inception of the search. Rather than rest its decision on the incidental nature of the search, the Court stressed
the fact that the police were pursuing an armed felon, and reasoned that speed was essential. The fourth amendment does not
require the police to delay when doing so endangers lives.'0
Therefore, the warrantless entry and search were justified
because, "the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative."" The Court stated that,
"The permissible scope of search must, therefore, at the
least, be as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent
the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist
or escape."' 2
6. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United States,
282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
These cases involved fact situations where arrest preceded search.
8. Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
9. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). This case represents the upper limit in a line of
decisions allowing warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest.
10. 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
11. Id. at 298. The Court was quoting from McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948), which held, ironically, that the fourth amendment
was violated because the officers had time to secure a warrant and failed to
do so.
12. Id. at 299. The quoted language refers to a suspect at large. This
contributes to the conclusion, reached in note 1 supra, that the seizure took
place before arrest.
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In the past, the term "hot" or "fresh" pursuit has been associated with the making of arrests, 13 while the connection
between arrest and warrantless search has been to allow search
incidental to arrest. In the instant case the Court faced for the
first time the hybrid situation of a warrantless search made during the course of pursuit. It is likely that Hayden will be the
fountainhead of a series of cases dealing with questions, such
as the following.'14 Is the scope of the search in hot pursuit limited to the suspect and his weapons? What other evidence can
be seized in the course of that search? 15 Can any evidence that
connects the suspect to the crime for which he is pursued be
seized if it appears that the evidence was found while looking
for the suspect or his weapons?' If so, can evidence of an earlier,
unrelated crime committed by the suspect, or even a third person, be seized? Since the Court allowed the seizure of clothing
in the instant case, it can be said that the seizures are not
limited strictly to the suspect, his weapons, fruits of the crime,
and contraband. However, the ruling can hardly be interpreted
as allowing indiscriminate seizures of evidence whenever the
police are closing in on a suspect, even if the search itself is
valid.
There are at least two underlying reasons for excusing lack
of a warrant for searches in hot pursuit. First, the danger posed
to policemen who deal with armed felons requires that they be
allowed to protect themselves by securing weapons that may be
13. See 5 AM. JuR. 2d Arrest § 52 (1962).

14. One question the Court expressly declined to consider, in that part
of the opinion dealing with mere evidence, is whether the seizure of evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature compels a person to become
a witness against himself in violation of the fifth amendment. 387 U.S. 294,
302-03 (1967).
15. The Court narrowly averted consideration of this question in Gilbert

v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269 (1967). In this robbery case, the California
Supreme Court upheld the seizure of a notebook containing drawings of a
robbed bank and a photograph of one of the defendants on the ground that
the seizing officers were in "fresh pursuit" of escaping felons. However, the
United States Supreme Court vacated certiorari as improvidently granted on

the basis that the facts were not clear enough to decide the question. Justice Douglas felt the search and seizure issue should have been met, and

that it was sufficient reason for reversing the conviction. He noted that
even if the circumstances justified the search for the suspect, there was no
reason to open the envelope containing the photograph since it could contain neither a suspect nor a weapon. Id. at 290.
16. On whom is the burden of proof? The Court said: "But even if we
assume, although we do not decide, that the exigent circumstances in this
case made lawful a search without warrant only for the suspect or his weapons, it cannot be said on this record that the officer who found the clothes
in the washing machine was not searching for weapons." 387 U.S. 294, 299
(1967).
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used against them. Secondly, an immediate entry and search of
the premises is necessary to prevent escape of the suspect. What
is the effect on a seizure if the suspect does escape the attempt
to apprehend him? It seems that belief on the part of the pursuing officers as to whether the suspect is within the premises
would be of prime importance. If, for example, officers arrive
at the suspected location and immediately learn that the felon
has fled, they seemingly have no justification for a warrantless
search. On the other hand, if they reasonably believe that the
suspect is still within the premises, then a search should be
proper and seizures made before discovering that the suspect is
absent should be upheld. 17 The police should not have to be
absolutely certain of the armed felon's location before they are
privileged to take measures designed to prevent resistance or
escape.
For guidance in limiting hot pursuit searches and seizures,
the Court might consider other search situations. A well-established rule allows a search without warrant, when incidental to
a lawful arrest, of a suspect and the premises under his immediate control.' 8 In one case, the Court upheld an hour-long
search of the defendant's desk, safe, and file cabinet. 19 And in
another, it approved a five-hour search resulting in the seizure
of draft cards from among the suspect's personal papers, even
though he was arrested for an unrelated offense.2 0 In contrast
to this is the indication in the cases (especially those dealing
with books and papers) that where there is a search under a
valid search warrant, absent an arrest, only evidence particularly
described in the warrant may be seized.21 This reflects the Court's
17. Once the police become fully aware that the suspect is not within
the premises, it is difficult to justify any subsequent search and seizure. The
suspect poses no danger to them, and, obviously, it is too late to prevent
his escape. But see People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365 (Calif. 1965), in which the
California Supreme Court upheld seizures made in the suspect's apartment
after the pursuing officers learned that he was not there. The court said:
"[Tihey could properly look through the apartment for anything that could
be used to identify the suspects or to expedite the pursuit." Id. at 375. The
United States Supreme Court did not pass on this issue in its consideration
of the case. See note 15 supra.
18. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
19. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
20. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
21. In Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925), the Court allowed the
seizure of cases of gin under a warrant that specified "cases of whiskey."
But in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), the Court held that a
warrant authorizing a search for liquor and articles of its manufacture
would not sustain the seizure of a ledger and bills relating to the running of
defendant's business (although the seizure was upheld as being incidental
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great concern with the specificity requirement. A third possibility is to develop a new category of limitations exclusively for
search in hot pursuit.
The judicial history of the fourth amendment reveals a
balancing of the need for effective law enforcement against the
right of the people to be free from unreasonable intrusions by
the state. To completely deny the right of search in hot pursuit
situations would appear to unduly hamper efforts to apprehend
escaping felons. This the Court did not do. But while the principle is a desirable one, considerable uncertainties remain to be
clarified, some of which have perhaps been indicated in this Note.
Dan E. Melichar

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DuE PROCESS IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

Gerald Gault, a fifteen year old on juvenile court probation,
was arrested pursuant to a neighbor's verbal allegation that she
had received an obscene phone call from him. His parents were
not informed of his arrest, nor were they notified of an informal
hearing held the next day. After spending four days in a detention home, Gault was released. Mrs. Gault then received a note
informing her that further hearings concerning her son's "delinquency" were pending. At the second hearing Gault was
adjudged a delinquent and committed to the State Industrial
School for the duration of his minority. The offended neighbor
was not present at either hearing nor were records made of the
to lawful arrest). The Court said: "The requirement that warrants shall
particularly describe the things to be seized . . . prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Id. at 196.
In Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965), the Court, citing Marron with
approval, held that officers who seized a large quantity of the petitioner's
private books and papers under a warrant authorizing the search for written
instruments concerning the Communist Party had violated the fourth amendment, because the warrant did not describe, with sufficient particularity, that
which was to be seized. A similar holding is found in Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961), involving the seizure of obscene publications. But see lower federal court cases upholding the seizure of evidence
not described in the warrant: Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1967); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d
602 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965); United States v. Myers,
329 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d
539 (D.C. Cir. 1961).

